Deal preserves Raila’s place at the centre of Kenya’s political scene

Mr Moses Wetang'ula, Mr Kalonzo Musyoka and other Nasa leaders strategise on the way forward after Mr Raila Odinga's pact with President Uhuru Kenyatta. PHOTO | FILE | NATION MEDIA GROUP

What you need to know:

  • While leaving out key actors ensured a quick settlement, it also creates problems for the principals.
  • Ruto wants assurances that his political path remains clear even when Uhuru is working with Raila.

The détente between President Uhuru Kenyatta and “the people’s president” Raila Odinga brings relief to a political feud that has been going on since 2005, when Mr Odinga led a group of rebels in the Kibaki government in opposing the so-called Kilifi Draft Constitution that was presented for a referendum that year.

The peak of that grudge came in 2007, in the form of what is now called the post-election violence.

GRUDGE

Although Mr Kibaki, rather than Mr Kenyatta, was the direct protagonist in the quarrel, Mr Kenyatta’s presidency, viewed by some as an inheritance from Kibaki, also inherited the grudge with Mr Odinga.

By other means, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Odinga have sustained the feud.

Unlike in 2008, when the African Union and the international community intervened, establishing an elaborate mediation whose processes eliminated surprise, mystery still surrounds the process by which the settlement between Mr Kenyatta and Mr Odinga was reached.

MEDIATORS

In 2008, the elaborate mediation process, with designated representatives of the two feuding sides, was often slowed down by the hard-line positions taken at their level, even before involving their respective principals.

The power-sharing agreement, the most difficult bargain in the talks, was only reached because, in the end, the mediators negotiated with Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga directly, bypassing their advisers.

Whether or not as a result of lessons from 2008, the current settlement was made with the principals, without involving handlers.

STRUGGLE

While leaving out key political actors may have ensured a settlement that might otherwise have been difficult to reach, it also creates problems for the principals who will now struggle to sell their agreement to their supporters.

On the Kenyatta side, Deputy President William Ruto would have had the biggest say besides the President.

Mr Ruto and his close circle of supporters have publicly supported the settlement, making it easier to sell the agreement to their grassroots support.

ADVISERS

Having initially reacted strongly to the settlement, the three other principals – Mr Kalonzo Musyoka, Mr Musalia Mudavadi and Mr Moses Wetang’ula – who, with Odinga, constitute the National Super Alliance, have been more guarded about their position.

The final position they will take remains a work in progress, with infighting in the coalition reported.

Within Mr Odinga’s party, the Orange Democratic Movement, the influential and often radical team of advisers that have been leading the process on “the people’s assemblies” have expressed support for the settlement, calling off the assemblies.

SUBSTANCE

It is not surprising that supporters should take a different position from the one negotiated by their leader, following a process they were not involved in.

While not involving them in the negotiation increased chances of a settlement, it came with the risk that others might genuinely have different views about the settlement, or might opportunistically use the non-involvement as an excuse for undermining it.

Besides issues of process, another problem in taking a position about the Kenyatta/Odinga détente lies in the fact that the substance is unclear.

SECRETARIAT

The statement by the two principals committed to establishing a secretariat staffed by the two sides, which will presumably flesh out a process by which content will be processed.

Besides the reactions of the elite leadership, how the settlement is received at the grassroots is also important.

The history of the country suggests that, in the strongholds, the grassroots ultimately comes round to supporting whatever position the top leader takes on important political questions.

TICKET

Thus, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto, whose supporters were on opposing sides in the 2007 elections, ended up sharing a ticket in the following elections in 2013, their previously-warring support bases coming round to forming united support for the pair.

What makes this moment less predictable than before, however, is unless there is a personal benefit for key elites on all sides, some of them might not go along.

By working with Mr Kenyatta, Mr Odinga will have less need for Mr Musyoka, Mr Mudavadi and Mr Wetang’ula than before.

Also, their political path will become less clear. Why would they still stick around under the circumstances?

ASSURANCES

While Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto are likely to remain glued together by incumbency, the deputy president will want assurances that his political path remains clear even when Mr Kenyatta is working with Mr Odinga.

Whether or not Mr Kenyatta can provide such assurances depends, in part, on what he has negotiated with Mr Odinga, which will also be an important consideration by the Nasa principals.

In 2008, Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga were yoked together by an agreement neither of them really wanted and which they tolerated, rather than enjoyed.

BURDEN

Without their own commitment to make it work, others including the international community, bore a significant share of the burden of keeping the agreement in place.

Having negotiated on their own, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Odinga are assuming the burden for getting their agreement to work.

In principle, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Odinga are in a better place than Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga were in 2008.

Unlike in 2008 when Mr Kibaki did not care whether or not Mr Odinga stayed in the coalition, Mr Kenyatta would want this to work and would be forced to ensure that he keeps Mr Odinga reasonably happy as to continue supporting their new relationship.

OPTIONS

As part of this, Mr Kenyatta must appear to make it worth Mr Odinga’s while for cooperating, and what stake he gets out of the new arrangement remains a key detail on whether or not the agreement will work.

While Mr Odinga has options outside of this cooperation, those would be demanding and would probably not be attractive, especially so soon after a gruelling election period.

RECUPERATE

If only to recuperate and recalibrate, Mr Odinga will stick with Mr Kenyatta, especially if his Nasa colleagues walk out on him.

Ultimately, therefore, the Kenyatta/Odinga agreement is a placeholder for the two.

It restores a level of normalcy to a political situation in which Mr Kenyatta had lost control despite holding the formal instruments of power.

By signing, Mr Kenyatta acquires the legitimacy to govern.

CHOKEHOLD

Importantly, President Kenyatta also frees himself of the chokehold that Mr Ruto has had over him within their party.

For Mr Odinga, this agreement preserves his place at the centre of the country’s political scene, removes from his shoulders the heavy burden of leading an opposition, and creates time to think and plan.