Kenyans’ popular demands for assistance drive politicians’ quest for high pay, allowances

When one considers basic salaries relative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Kenyan legislators are among the highest paid in the world. Their basic salaries are then topped up by generous allowances – from grants for expensive cars and mortgages for new houses to sizeable mileage to sitting allowances.

The legislators have also proved adept at periodically increasing, and protecting, these perks. This reality grabbed the headlines this week when it emerged that they will receive backdated allowances, which were removed by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) last year. Yet, this is coming at a time when the majority of ordinary Kenyans are struggling to make ends meet.

To summarise, prior to last year’s election, the SRC proposed a new pay structure that would cut MPs’ salaries from Sh710,000 to Sh621,250, and replace their car grants and mileage allowances with a fixed monthly transport allowance.

However, in December last year, the lawmakers successfully challenged this change through the courts, and they will now receive backdated car maintenance and mileage allowances.

ALLOWANCES

According to recent news reports, this will see each of the country’s 416 MPs receive at least Sh668,000 in allowances and salary at the end of the month while the National Treasury will release another Sh2.1 billion for car grants alone.

In a difficult economic climate, this development is understandably seen by many as “greed of the highest order”. However, whilst self-interest, and a desire to display status through the use of big expensive cars is clearly an important part of the story, the reality is more complex.

The issue is one of a reinforcing cycle whereby ordinary people have long paid little attention to the role of elected politicians as legislators, and instead, they have largely evaluated their leaders on their track record of direct and indirect assistance. As Joel Barkan highlighted in a 1976 American political science review article, most Kenyans expect legislators to provide a link between them and the government, and, if politicians do not conform “with the expectations of their constituents”, they face a stiff challenge at the next election.

This approach was institutionalised under President Jomo Kenyatta through the system of harambee or community fundraisers. It was then reinforced by the introduction of constituency development funds in 2003, and by the devolution of power following the inauguration of the 2010 Constitution and subsequent creation of new ward development funds.

ASSIST CONSTITUENTS

This view of legislators as people who should directly assist their constituents clearly has some positive implications. The majority of Kenyans know who their local politician is, and they vote them out if they do not perform, and thus politicians regularly contribute to everything, from weddings and funerals to school bursaries and local development projects.

The downside, however, is that aspirant MPs – especially if they are deemed to be wealthy – are expected to contribute to local events and projects or risk being accused of being ‘useless’ or ‘mean’. At the same time, people’s demands and expectations far outweigh official salaries and access to development funds.

The outcome is that most aspirants accrue significant debts during their campaigns and, on election, they immediately face constant demands for assistance. As a result, they have much motivation – beyond individual greed and a penchant for driving big cars – to maximise their formal and informal incomes from large salaries and allowances, and to simultaneously accumulate cash through more nefarious and corrupt means. 

REDUCE SALARIES

This reinforcing cycle of assistance to constituents,  demands for help, and the need to accumulate resources to pay off debts and meet future demands, is then further reinforced by a pervasive sense of popular scepticism. In short, most people expect politicians to be greedy and corrupt and thus often do not censure those who are, as long as they deliver goods to the local level.

As a result, there is little incentive for politicians to vote to reduce their salaries or to remain clean, and significant incentives to build up ‘war chests’ so that they can see off competitors in regular, and highly-competitive, elections. Many politicians may thus see an election as a way to gain status and accrue wealth, but they are also ambitious and seek to gain and then retain power for a whole host of reasons.

 Gabrielle Lynch is Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Warwick. [email protected]; @GabrielleLynch6